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Abstract 
Science related news stories can have a profound impact on how the public make 
decisions. The current study presents four experiments that examine how participants 
understand scientific expressions used in news headlines. The expressions concerned causal 
and correlational relationships between variables (e.g. “being breast fed makes children 
behave better”). Participants rated or ranked headlines according to the extent that one 
variable caused the other. Our results suggest that participants differentiate between three 
distinct categories of relationship: direct cause statements (e.g. “makes”, “increases”), which 
were interpreted as the most causal; can cause statements (e.g. “can make”, “can increase”); 
and moderate cause statements (e.g. "might cause", “linked”, “associated with”), but do not 
consistently distinguish within the last group despite the logical distinction between cause and 
association.  Based on this evidence, we make recommendations for appropriately 
communicating cause and effect in news headlines.  
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How readers understand causal and correlational expressions 
used in news headlines 
 
Science stories in the media have profound effects on public health. For example, 
following coverage of the measles, mumps and rubella vaccine scare in the later 1990s, 
immunisation rates dropped (Health and Social Care Information Centre, 2009), with 
consequent increases in disease incidence (Ramsey, 2013). It is therefore important that 
science writers use language that conveys information consistent with the peer-reviewed 
papers. In this study we systemically test how people understand scientific expressions used 
in media headlines. Our overall aim is to contribute evidence-based advice for science writers 
attempting to clearly communicate the conclusions of a study. 
There is growing evidence that science stories contain exaggerations of scientific 
findings (Brechman, Lee, & Cappella, 2009; Cooper, Lee, Goldacre, & Sanders, 2012; 
Haneef, Lazarus, Ravaud, Yavchitz, & Boutron, 2015; Leveson, 2012; Schwitzer, 2008; 
Sumner et al., 2014; Sumner et al., under review; Woloshin, Schwartz, Casella, Kennedy, & 
Larson, 2009). For example, Sumner et al. (2014), found that 33% of press releases and 81% 
of the associated new stories contained causal claims when the peer-reviewed papers 
described correlational studies. Exaggeration is problematic because if the public adjust their 
behaviour in proportion to the extremity and certainty of news stories, behavioural change 
will be exaggerated relative to the intentions of the peer-reviewed authors. The consequences 
could be as severe as patients refusing to take prescribed medicine (as with statins, see e.g., 
Bosely, 2014). Exaggeration in the media also demonstrates that there is a misalignment 
between science writing and the peer-reviewed articles on which they are based. 
While there is a general consensus that exaggeration exists, there is no accepted 
explanation for why. The problem cannot be attributed solely to journalistic practices because 
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exaggerations appear in press releases, written by scientists and press officers, not journalists 
(Brechman et al., 2009; Sumner et al., 2014, under review; Woloshin et al., 2009). This 
suggests that all of the contributors to science in the media, including scientists, share 
responsibility for the failure to inform the public. One suggestion for why exaggeration 
occurs is that science writers are under pressure to make their stories accessible and 
interesting, and in doing so, they use language that results in exaggeration. For example, 
writers might try to avoid dry scientific jargon, like “correlates with”, and instead use 
everyday expressions like, “increases.” So, “Being breast fed correlates with good 
behaviour” becomes, “Being breast fed increases good behaviour.” They might also try to 
vary the language so as not to use the same expression in every headline. Instead of always 
using, “linked with”, say, they may prefer to use, “results in” on occasions. Finally, they may 
prefer to describe a study using short, succinct expressions instead of longer phrases, so that 
instead of “is associated with”, they use, “causes.”  
That there are exaggerations in news stories does not mean that science writers intend 
to exaggerate the scientific claims. Instead, they may simply not know how the reader will 
understand the expressions they use (or alternatively, the science writer may not understand 
the specific expressions used in the peer-reviewed articles). Scientific expressions mean 
different things to different people. For example, “Being breast fed is linked with good 
behaviour” could be interpreted as being breast fed causes good behaviour, or as being breast 
fed correlates with good behaviour, depending on the reader’s knowledge, prior beliefs and 
the general context. Furthermore, scientific articles often contain probabilistic expressions, 
such as “might”, which have notoriously variable meanings across samples (Budescu & 
Wallsten, 1985), and modal verbs, such as “can” or “may”, which have many subtly different 
senses (Kennedy, 2002). Scientific language is detailed and specific, and translating it into 
language that others outside of the community understand is difficult. 
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The difficulty of finding appropriate expressions for scientific terms is reflected in the 
number of best-practice guides for science writers (Science Media Centre, 2012; Straight 
Statistics and Sense about Science, 2010; Schwitzer, 2010). Services such as 
HealthNewsReview.org are popular (receiving ~ 5000 hits per day; source: 
www.semrush.com), and in common with the resources cited above, provide intuitively 
sound advice and raise awareness of the general difficulties of misinterpreting scientific 
expressions. However, their detailed suggestions about appropriate vocabulary are generally 
based on the judgment of only a few individuals. In terms of how the reader understands the 
relevant expressions there is little evidence-based guidance for science writers except their 
own personal experience and the general information provided in the above-mentioned 
resources. In this study we aim to provide the evidence base by systematically testing how 
people understand scientific expressions used.  
We focus on causal and correlational expressions. Scientific studies that employ 
designs with random assignment to conditions are generally more informative than studies 
that observe existing relationships between variables; namely, the former allow causal 
inference whereas the latter do not. Science writers must consequently take particular care in 
describing studies to make sure they do not conflate correlation with causation. However, 
exaggeration from correlation to causation in the media is particularly common (Sumner et 
al., 2014). For example, where an original study makes correlative conclusions (“Being breast 
fed is correlated with good behaviour”), the associated media headline might describe the 
findings using causal language (“Being breast fed results in good behaviour”). The need for 
guidance on the meaning of causal and correlational expressions is particularly important. 
Previous experimental work on understanding cause and correlation (e.g., Bleske-
Rechek, Morrison, & Heidtke, 2015; Mueller & Coon, 2013; Norris, Phillips, & Korpan, 
2003) has been from an educational perspective, rather than a media perspective, and has 
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focussed on whether individuals make appropriate scientific inferences from descriptions of 
experimental and observational study designs. These studies found that participants often 
confused correlation and causation. For example, Bleske-Rechek et al. (2015) presented a 
well-educated community sample with descriptions of a causal study (random assignment to 
conditions) or a correlational study (an observational study) and asked about the causal 
inferences that could be derived from the reported results. Bleske-Rechek et al. found that 
participants who read correlational studies made the same inferences as those who read 
causal studies. Similarly, Norris et al. (2003) found that only a third of psychology 
undergraduate students could correctly identify causal and correlational statements from 
media reports. When people are asked to extract and comprehend the relevant information 
from study descriptions they appear to have great difficulty. While these sorts of studies are 
very useful for assessing scientific understanding, they address a different question to what 
we are concerned with here. We sought to identify how strongly different expressions 
communicate causal relationships, rather than whether people can extract relevant study 
design information.  
Overview of Experiments 
Participants in the current study read headlines such as, “Being breast fed makes 
children behave better” and judged how much they thought one variable in the headline 
caused the other. For the breast-feeding headline, for example, they rated the extent to which 
being breastfed caused better behaviour in children. We used a variety of relational 
expressions in the headlines, such as “makes”, “increases” or “is linked to”, and a range of 
sentence frames with appropriate independent variables and outcomes. Expressions that 
imply a strong causal relationship between variables should lead to high causal ratings and 
vice versa.  
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We used headlines rather than complete news stories because we believe headlines are 
particularly important in communicating news. People arguably spend longer looking at 
headlines than the main text (Dor, 2003), and when they do look at the text, the headline can 
have a continued influence, such that misleading headlines are resistant to correction despite 
the subsequent text (Ecker, Lewandowsky, Chang, & Pillai, 2014; Ecker, Swire, & 
Lewandowsky, 2014; Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook, 2012). We also 
wanted to avoid introducing extraneous material that could confound the interpretation of 
relational expressions in the headline (e.g., inclusion of caveats, quotes from scientists, 
details of experimental procedures). 
The materials for relational expressions were derived from those used in an analysis of 
Russell Group Health and Life Sciences press releases from 2011 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.903704; Sumner et al., 2014). Sumner et al. (2014) 
measured exaggerations of scientific findings in press releases and news stories. To quantify 
the causal inferences in headline claims, they developed a coding scheme in which each 
relational expression was categorized based on its causal implications (see Table S1 
Supplementary Information). Expressions judged as implying the most causality (e.g., 
“increase”, “reduces”) were assigned to the direct cause group, expressions judged as 
implying correlation (e.g., “relates to”) were assigned to the correlation group, and 
expressions of middling causality were assigned to the intervening groups. We used a 
selection of relational expressions from each group as the basis for our experiments. For 
example, in Experiment 1, we compared judgements of direct causal statements with 
ambiguous statements and correlation statements. While the judgements of Sumner et al. 
might turn out to be incorrect (the coding scheme is based on their intuitions), it is 
nonetheless a useful starting point because it presents a framework around which we can 
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make predictions in our task (direct causal expressions should be rated as most causal, can 
cause as next most causal etc.).  
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 had two goals. First, we aimed to test whether people are sensitive to the 
difference between causal and correlational expressions in newspaper headlines. Norris et al. 
(2003) and Bleske-Rechek et al. (2015) demonstrate that readers often fail to distinguish 
between causal and correlational study designs and readers might also fail to discriminate 
between causal and correlational expressions.  
Second, given that readers might be sensitive to the difference in strength between 
causal and correlational expressions, we were interested in how people understand ambiguous 
expressions, such as “is linked to”, in “Being breast fed is linked to better behaviour in 
children.” Ambiguous expressions might be understood in several ways. Readers might think 
that since there is no direct causal expression in the sentence, the writer must mean that there 
is no causal relationship. Under this reasoning, ratings for ambiguous expressions would be 
lower than those for causal ratings and similar to those of correlative expressions. On the 
other hand, readers might think the opposite: since there is no correlative expression and no 
statement about the absence of a relationship, ambiguous expressions should be read as 
communicating a strong, and quite possibly causal relationship. Here, there should be little 
difference between causal and ambiguous expressions, but both should be perceived as 
stronger than correlative expressions. Finally, readers may sense the ambiguity and rate the 
sentences somewhere between causal and correlative expressions (as in the coding scheme of 
Sumner et al., 2014). 
We also collected information about the science training of the participants. We 
expected that participants with more science training might be more likely to derive causal 
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inferences from causal statements and less likely to derive causal inferences from 
correlational statements. 
Method 
Participants. Eighty-eight participants were recruited through social media (using 
Twitter). Seventeen participants were excluded from all statistical analyses due to study 
incompletion (19% attrition rate), leaving a final sample of 71 participants (49 female, 22 
male; aged 17-63, M=27.72, SE=1.31). Participants were randomly allocated to one of three 
counterbalancing lists (ns = 17, 19 and 35 for each list respectively). All experiments were 
approved by the School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee, Cardiff University. 
Design and materials. Headline topic (science, sport and business/ politics) and 
relationship category (direct cause, ambiguous, and correlation) were within-subject factors. 
We recorded participants’ science experience and coded this as a between-subject factor 
(none, A-Level1 only, degree only, both A-level and degree). Experiment 1 consequently had 
a 3 x 3 x 4 design. The dependent measure was the causality rating for each headline, this was 
measured using a visual analogue scale from 0 “definitely does not cause” to 100 “definitely 
does cause”. 
The materials were based around nine sentence frames. The frames were news 
headlines sourced from an online news search. Table 1 shows an example. There were three 
sentence frames from science headlines, three from sport and three from business/politics. 
Each of the frames included two variables, one that was more likely to be a causal agent (e.g., 
being breast fed) and one that was more likely to be an outcome (e.g., good behaviour). 
Experimental sentences were formed by inserting a relational expression between the two 
variables, with the causal agent always appearing in subject position and the outcome in 
object position (i.e. [causal agent] expression [outcome]). Wherever the direct cause 
                                                          
1
 A-levels are a national set of UK qualifications typically studied at 16-18 years.  
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expression specified a direction, we included a directional expression such as “higher” or 
“lower” in the headlines of the other conditions. For example, since “boost” communicates an 
increase in the outcome, such as, “Healthier diet boosts childhood IQ,” we added “higher” to 
the correlation and ambiguous conditions, such as, “Healthier diet has a relationship with 
higher childhood IQ.” Thus there were no differences across conditions in directional 
information. 
The main independent variable was the relational category. There were three types: 
direct cause relationships, which used the expressions “makes”, “leads to” and “boosts”; 
ambiguous relationships, which used the expressions “is linked to”, “is connected to” and 
“predicts”; and correlation relationships, which used the expressions “is associated with”, “is 
related to” and “has a relationship with” (see Table 1 for an example of one sentence frame 
with each category of relationship; see Table 2 for all relational expressions used in 
Experiments 1-4).  
Participants saw nine sentences. Each sentence was based on a different sentence frame 
and used a different relational expression. Expressions were assigned to topics (science, 
sport, and business/politics) in such a way that each topic included one expression from each 
category (consequently topic and relational category formed within-subject factors in the 
design).  
Counter-balancing of expression to sentence frame was achieved by generating 27 
sentences, three from each sentence frame, and dividing them into three counter-balancing 
lists (all materials are provided in the Supplementary Information). Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the three lists. 
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Table 1. Example stimuli from Experiment 1. 
Relationship Category Sentence 
Direct cause Being breast fed makes children behave better 
Ambiguous Being breast fed is linked to better behaviour in children 
Correlation Being breast fed is associated with better behaviour in children 
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Table 2. Relational expressions used in Experiments 1-4.  
 Relationship category 
 Direct cause Can cause Conditional cause Ambiguous Correlation Conditional correlation 
 
Experiment 1 
makes   is linked to is associated with  
leads to   is connected to is related to  
boosts   predicts has a relationship with  
 
Experiments  
2 & 3 
 
 
 
makes can… might… (E2 & E3)  is associated with  
leads to  may…   (E3 only)  is related to  
boosts  could… (E3 only)  has a relationship with  
impacts    varies with  
drives    
 
 
induces     
heightens     
increases     
influences     
is attributable to     
elevates     
optimises     
 
Experiment 4 
 
 
boosts can… might…  is linked to is associated with might… 
decreases  may…    predicts is related to may…    
elevates  could…  
 
could… 
increases     
leads to     
lowers   
 
 
 
raises     
reduces     
responsible for     
results in     
Note. Experiments used only the expressions shown in the relevant sections of the table. Direct cause, ambiguous, and correlation expressions were inserted 
directly into sentence frames. Can cause, conditional cause, and conditional correlation expressions were formed by combining the listed modal verbs with 
expressions from the direct cause or correlation categories, e.g., Experiment 4 can cause condition used can elevate, and the conditional correlation 
condition used might be associated with
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Procedure. Participants were informed that they would be taking part in a study of 
how people interpret information in news headlines. Sentences were presented one after 
another and responses collected immediately after the presentation of each sentence. 
Participants were asked “According to the headline, to what extent does [causal agent] cause 
[outcome]?”  Each sentence was presented for a minimum of 5 seconds to ensure that 
participants read the sentences. Following the experimental questions participants were asked 
whether they had completed a science-based A-Level or science-based degree. 
Statistical analysis  
All results are reported with unadjusted p-values. Corrections for multiple comparisons 
were calculated for all within-test analyses and are only reported where these corrections 
changed the interpretation of an analysis from statistically significant to non-significant. The 
alpha level for comparison is shown as the p-value subscript. Departures from sphericity 
assumptions were corrected as a function of Huynh-Feldt epsilon. We also report sensitivity 
analyses in the Supplementary Information. 
We used Bayes factors to interpret the evidential value of nonsignificant findings 
(Dienes, 2011, 2014; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). With no previous 
literature to guide an informed prior we used the default JZS prior (Rouder et al., 2009) for 
all analyses. The JZS prior is a non-informative objective prior that minimises assumptions 
regarding expected effect size. Bayes factors using the JZS prior were calculated using JASP 
(r was set a priori to the default value, r = 0.707; Love et al., 2015). Bayes factors > 3 suggest 
‘substantial’ evidence for the alternative hypothesis and Bayes factors < 0.33 indicate 
‘substantial’ evidence for the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2011, 2014). All study data is available 
online (https://github.com/SolveigaVG/CausalLanguage.git). 
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Results  
Figure 1 shows mean causality ratings as a function of topic and relationship category. 
For each topic, direct cause sentences were rated as highly causal with scores between ~75-
80. Ambiguous and correlation sentences were rated as much less causal with scores between 
~45-55. A 3x3x4 mixed ANOVA revealed a significant overall effect of relationship category 
(F (2,134)=117.79, p<0.001, η2p =0.64), with causality ratings for direct cause significantly 
greater than for both the ambiguous (p<0.001; dz2= 1.59) and correlation (p<0.001; dz= 1.48) 
conditions. The difference between ambiguous and correlation conditions was not 
statistically significant and substantially favoured the null hypothesis over the alternative 
hypothesis (p=0.42; dz= 0.09; B=0.21). The main effect of topic (F (2, 134)=1.05, p=0.35, η2p 
=0.02; B=0.07) and the interaction between topic and category (F (4, 272)=0.24, p=0.92, η2p 
=0.003; B=0.02) were non-significant and favoured the null. 
To assess whether having experience with statistics was related to causality ratings 
participants were asked whether they had a science-based A-level or degree. Participants 
were categorised as having no experience (n=18), a science A-level (n=17), a science degree 
(n=14), or both (n=22). The results of the ANOVA revealed no main effect of experience (F 
(2,68)=1.59, p=0.21, η2p =0.02, B=0.10) and no significant interactions with topic or 
relationship category (all Fs <1.19, all ps>0.29, all η2ps<0.05; all Bs <0.06). These results are 
consistent with previous findings showing that science education appears to be unrelated to 
how well students are able to interpret scientific media reports (Norris et al., 2003). 
Due to our random assignment method there was an unequal distribution of participants 
to counterbalancing lists (see Participants section). We therefore conducted an additional 
analysis on the first 17 participants assigned to each list, i.e., the maximum number of 
                                                          
2
 Cohen’s dz = Mdiff√∑ (Xdiff – Mdiff)2
N-1
 ; suggested values for small, medium and large effects are 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8, 
respectively (Cohen, 1988). 
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participants such that there was an equal distribution of participants to lists. The analysis 
revealed the same pattern of significant effects as the complete analysis (see Supplementary 
Information for full analysis). 
 
 
Figure 1. Mean causality ratings for the three categories of relationship as a function of topic in 
Experiment 1. Error bars show ±1 within subject standard error (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008). 
 
Discussion 
Participants overwhelmingly rated directly causal sentences as more causal than 
correlational and ambiguous sentences. While this result corresponds with our own intuitions, 
previous studies have shown that students have difficulty distinguishing between causal and 
correlational designs when the studies are presented as vignettes (e.g., Bleske-Rechek et al., 
2015; Norris et al., 2003) and it would not have been surprising if students were also 
impervious to the distinction when claims were made in sentences, as in our study. 
Interestingly, however, there was no significant difference between the ambiguous and 
correlation conditions, and the Bayes factor demonstrated substantial support for the null 
hypothesis rather than a general insensitivity of our experiment. People perceive causality in 
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ambiguous expressions and correlational expressions equivalently, contrary to the coding 
scheme of Sumner et al. (2014).  
Finally, although participants rated directly causal statements as most causal, they still 
rated correlational and ambiguous sentences as moderately causal (around 50%). This 
suggests that our participants were either uncertain about these phrases or that they believe 
even the weakest relational expressions imply causality. Results from our pilot work provide 
evidence for the latter. When we presented questions in which the likely cause and direction 
of outcome were reversed, relative to a presented news headline, causal ratings were low 
(~20%). This demonstrates that participants were comfortable with providing low ratings 
when deemed appropriate. These results also suggest that participants in the current 
experiment judged correlational and ambiguous expressions to imply a moderately causal 
relationship. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiments 2 and 3, we consider how modal verbs, such as can, may and might, 
alter causal inferences. Modal verbs are used when writers want to express uncertainty or 
doubt about the truth of their statement (in this context). For example, might in “Being breast 
fed might make children behave better,” suggests that the writer is uncertain about the 
relationship between breast feeding and behaviour. However, there are different sorts of 
modal verbs and there may be differences in the type of uncertainty each conveys. This 
variation could result in differing degrees of causal implications across verbs. 
In Experiment 2 we tested four categories of relational expression: direct cause, can 
cause, might cause and correlation (see Table 3). We had three goals. First, we wanted to 
confirm that the apparent uncertainty introduced by the modal verbs resulted in fewer causal 
implications relative to direct cause expressions. Intuition suggests they do but we can find 
no previous studies about this. Second, we wanted to discover whether “can” and “might” 
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were perceived to express different degrees of uncertainty in news headlines. “Might” 
conveys a possibility of an event (e.g., “John might give a good talk”), whereas “can” 
conveys an ability, (“John can give a good talk”) or a conditionality (“John can give a good 
talk if he prepares well enough”). This would suggest that “can” generates more causal 
implications than “might”, and reflecting this, Sumner et al. (2014) coded “can” as generating 
more causal implications than “might” (see Table S1, Supplementary Information). 
 Finally, we wanted to know whether modal verbs modifying causal expressions 
implied more causal implications than simple correlational expressions, such as “associated 
with”. Since correlational expressions do not explicitly express causality, it might be 
expected that modal causal expressions generate more causal implication than simple 
correlational expressions. This is the view of the HealthNewsReview.org website, which 
explicitly suggests using “associated with” instead of qualified causal expressions, such as 
“might boost”. More generally, a writer wishing to communicate uncertainty about a causal 
relationship might prefer correlational expressions for stylistic reasons, such as the added 
length of modal verbs, or the need to be direct without qualification.  
 18 
Method 
Participants. One hundred and sixty five psychology undergraduate students at Cardiff 
University participated for partial course credit. Five participants were excluded from the 
analysis for incomplete data. The remaining participants (N=160; 137 female, 21 male, 2 
missing values; aged 17-30, M=19.36, SE=0.13) were randomly distributed to one of four 
counterbalancing lists (ns = 26, 24, 79 and 31). 
Design, materials and procedure. Experiment 2 had a 3 x 4 x 2 design. Topic 
(science, sport and business/ politics) and relationship category (direct cause, can cause, 
might cause, correlation) were within-subject factors and Year of study, (Year 1 or 2) was a 
between subject factor. 
The materials were based around 12 sentence frames. Nine were taken from Experiment 
1 and three more were sourced using an online news search, one each for science, sport and 
business/politics. Construction of the experimental sentences was similar to Experiment 1.  
Four categories of relationship were used: direct cause, can cause, might cause and 
correlation. There were 12 causal expressions and four correlational expressions (see Table 
2; the assignment of expressions to relationship categories was based on Sumner et al., 2014; 
see Table 3 for examples). Can cause and might cause sentences were formed by inserting 
the words “can” or “might” prior to the direct cause expression. For direct cause, can cause, 
and might cause conditions, the more likely causal agent was presented in subject position 
and the more likely outcome in object position (i.e. [causal agent] expression [outcome]). 
Because this ordering is not consistent with many correlational headlines in the media, we 
reversed the order for the correlation condition, that is, the more likely outcome was in 
subject position and the more likely causal agent was in object position ([outcome] 
expression [causal agent]).  
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Participants saw 12 sentences. Each sentence was based on a different sentence frame 
and used a different expression. Three of the sentence frames were assigned direct cause 
expressions, three can cause expressions, three might cause expressions, and three 
correlation expressions. Counter-balancing of expression to sentence frame was achieved 
using a method similar to Experiment 1, except that there were now a pool of 48 sentences 
and four counter-balancing lists (see Supplementary Information).  
The procedure was identical to that used in Experiment 1 with the exception that 
participants were asked to report their year of academic study in the debrief as opposed to 
whether or not they had completed a scientific degree.  
 
Table 3. Example stimuli from Experiment 2. 
Relationship Category Sentence 
Direct cause Being breast fed makes children behave better 
Can cause Being breast fed can make children behave better 
Might cause Being breast fed might make children behave better  
Correlation Better behaviour in children is associated with being breast fed 
 
Results 
Figure 2 shows that participants rated direct cause statements as more causal than 
correlation statements, consistent with Experiment 1. As expected, can cause was rated as 
less causal than direct cause but more causal than correlation. More interestingly, might 
cause was rated as less causal than correlation.  
This pattern was confirmed with a 3x4x2 mixed ANOVA. We observed a main effect 
of relationship category, (F (2.9, 458.77)= 84.61, p<0.001, η2p =0.35), with all pairwise 
comparisons reaching statistical significance (all ps
.008< 0.007, all dz> 0.22) including the 
comparison between might cause and correlation (p<0.001; dz=0.38). There was a large 
effect size for the comparison between direct cause and might cause (dz= 1.24) and medium-
large effect sizes for the comparisons between direct cause and both can cause and 
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correlation conditions (dz= 0.58 and 0.78, respectively) and between can cause and might 
cause (dz= 0.77). The effect size was small for the comparison between can cause and 
correlation.  
While the same general pattern holds across all three topics, there was a significant 
interaction between relationship category and topic (F (5.66, 893.91)=2.89, p=0.01, η2p 
=0.02). Business/ politics received lower causality ratings for the direct cause statement than 
the other topics, M=62 vs M = 68 and M = 71 for science and sport (p=0.003, dz=0.24; 
p<0.001, dz=0.33), respectively). 
Participants were also asked their year of academic study to see whether experience 
with statistics was related to causality ratings. Eighty-five participants reporting being in the 
first year and 75 participants reported being in the second year of their undergraduate 
psychology degree. Consistent with Experiment 1 and previous research exploring the role of 
statistical experience (Norris et al., 2003), the results of the mixed ANOVA revealed that 
there was no significant main effect of year of study (F (1, 158)=0.07, p=0.79, η2p <0.001, 
B=0.12) and no significant interactions with either topic or relationship category (all Fs 
<1.68, all ps>0.19, all η2ps<0.01; all Bs<0.06). 
As in Experiment 1, we conducted an additional analysis to avoid uneven 
counterbalancing groups using the first 24 participants from each group. The pattern of 
significant effects was very similar to the complete analysis except that the pairwise 
comparison between can cause and correlate (p=0.18, dz=0.13; B=0.26) and the interaction 
between topic and relationship category (F(5.61, 527.21)=1.69, p=0.12, η2p =0.02; B=0.02) 
were both nonsignificant (see Supplementary Information for the full analysis).  
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Figure 2. Mean causality ratings for the four categories of relationship as a function of topic in 
Experiment 2. Error bars show ±1 within subject standard error (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008) 
 
Discussion 
Modal verbs reduced causality ratings relative to expressions without modal verbs. The 
degree depended on the particular modal verb. Contrary to Sumner et al.’s (2014) coding 
scheme and the advice of HealthNewsReview.org, “might cause” was rated as less causal 
than even simple correlational expressions. In other words, expressions such as “associated 
with” were perceived as more causal than “might cause”, despite the intuition that “associated 
with” ought to convey correlation not causation.  
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 continued the investigation of the modal verbs and tested might cause, 
may cause, could cause and correlation expressions. “May” is argued by many usage guides 
to express greater likelihood than “might” (e.g., the BBC world service English guide3). For 
example, “John may go to the party” implies that John attending the party is more likely than 
“John might go to the party”. If so, “may” should lead to higher causal implications than 
                                                          
3
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/learningenglish/grammar/learnit/learnitv162.shtml 
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“might” in the context of newspaper headlines. We were also interested in replicating the 
finding from Experiment 2 that might cause was rated less strongly than correlational 
expressions, and whether other modal verbs would also lead to lower causality ratings than 
correlation expressions. We therefore included could cause and may cause. Sumner et al. 
(2014) grouped all three modal expressions together as “conditional cause,” and assumed 
they should generate more causal implications than correlation expressions. 
Method 
Participants. Ninety-nine psychology undergraduate students from Cardiff 
University participated in Experiment 3 for partial course credit. Two participants were 
excluded from all statistical analyses because they did not provide information regarding their 
academic year of study. The remaining participants (N=97; 78 female, 19 male; aged 18-46, 
M=19.86, SE=0.32) were randomly allocated to one of four counterbalancing lists (ns = 25, 
25, 23 and 24). 
Design, materials and procedure. Experiment 3 had a 3 x 4 x 2 design. Topic 
(science, sport and business/ politics) and relationship category (might cause, may cause, 
could cause, and correlation) were within-subject factors and Year of study, (Year 1 or 2) was 
a between subject factor. 
We used the same sentence frames as those in Experiment 2. The relational categories 
were different, however. Here we used might cause, may cause, could cause and correlation 
(see Tables 2 and 4, and Supplementary Information). Sentence construction and 
counterbalancing was the same as Experiment 2, except that the ordering of causal agents and 
outcomes was consistent across all four categories.  
The procedure was identical to that used in Experiment 2.  
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Table 4. Example stimuli from Experiment 3. 
Relationship Category Sentence 
Might cause Being breast fed might make children behave better  
Could cause Being breast fed could make children behave better  
May cause Being breast fed may make children behave better  
Correlation Being breast fed is associated with better behaviour in children 
 
 
Results 
Consistent with the results of Experiment 2, ratings for modal and correlational 
expressions were in the moderately causal range (between ~45-60), although causality ratings 
of the modal conditions (might cause, may cause, could cause) were lower than those of the 
correlation condition (Figure 3). A 3x4x2 mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect 
of relationship category (F (2.31, 219.71) =9.38, p<0.001, η2p =0.09). Pairwise comparisons 
showed that each modal condition was rated as significantly less causal than the correlation 
condition (all ps <0.004, all dzs > 0.3 and were in the small-medium range). The modal 
conditions did not significantly differ from one another (all ps
.008 >0.039, all dzs < 0.21; all 
Bs <0.91). This was confirmed with an additional exploratory ANOVA when the correlation 
condition was removed (main effect of expression: F (1.85, 175.9) =1.94, p=0.15, η2p =0.02; 
B= 0.15).There was no main effect of topic (F (2,190) =1.59, p=0.21, η2p =0.02; B=0.04) and 
no significant interaction between topic and relationship category (F (5.82, 552.7) =1.12, 
p=0.35, η2p =0.01; B=0.007).  
To explore the relationship between statistical experience and causal ratings, 
participants were again asked whether they were in the first (n=51) or second (n=46) year of 
their degree. The mixed ANOVA showed no main effect of year of study (F (1, 95) =0.27, 
p=0.59, η2p =0.003, B=0.23) and no significant interactions with either topic or relationship 
category (all Fs <0.81, all ps>0.49, all η2ps<0.01; all Bs <0.5). 
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Figure 3. Mean causality ratings for the four categories of relationship as a function of topic in 
Experiment 3. Error bars show ±1 within subject standard error (Cousineau, 2005; Morey, 2008) 
 
Discussion 
Participants rated might cause, may cause, and could cause as significantly less causal 
than simple correlation statements. Thus, in general, modal verbs combined with causal 
expressions reduce the causal implications of statements, and they do so to such a degree that 
the resulting causal implication is less than that of correlation expressions. In other words, 
correlational phrases must carry some causal implication, as indicated by the moderately high 
rating scores. This result contradicts the coding scheme of Sumner et al. (2014) and the 
advice in the HealthNewsReview.org website, which suggest that simple correlational 
expressions are less causal than modified causal expressions. It also contradicts the 
predictions of usage guides which suggest that “may” should lead to more causal implications 
than “might”. 
Experiment 4 
In Experiment 4 we tested all of the relational categories that we used in Experiments 1 
to 3, and an additional category, conditional correlation. The conditional correlative 
condition used expressions that were correlative, such as “is associated with,” combined with 
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a modal verb, such as “may”, as in “may be associated with.” This condition was included to 
test the hypothesis that the effects of the modal verbs seen in Experiment 3 generalised to 
correlative relationships as well as causal relationships. 
For converging evidence, we used a different method of assessing causal implications 
compared to our previous experiments. In Experiment 4 participants ranked six forms of a 
given headline presented simultaneously, one form for each category of relationship, 
according to the degree of causal implication generated by each expression. Table 5 shows an 
example. Participants saw only two questions. The changes to the design were introduced to: 
(1) establish that our previous results generalised using other methods; (2) eliminate any 
carry-over effects arising from participants rating many headlines; (3) test the coding scheme 
described in Sumner et al. (2014) using a method analogous to its intended use (i.e., a method 
of ranking statements into one of six distinct categories). 
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Method 
Participants. Five hundred and fifty-six participants were recruited using an online 
crowdsourcing platform (Prolific Academic). Fifty-seven participants were excluded from all 
statistical analyses because they failed to complete the task and 119 participants met the 
exclusion criterion (see below). The final sample size was 380 participants (225 females, 152 
females (3 missing values); aged 16-67, M=28.65, SE=0.52). Sample size was determined 
according to an a priori power analysis based on the results of Experiments 1- 3 (using 
G*Power; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The smallest significant effect size was 
used (dz= 0.22; the comparison between can cause and correlation in Experiment 2); to 
achieve 90% power this gave a required sample size of N= 373 (with α=0.003; after 
correction for 15 comparisons). 
Design and materials. Relationship category was the only factor in Experiment 4. 
There were six levels: direct cause, can cause, conditional cause, ambiguous, correlation and 
conditional correlation. The dependent measure was the causality ranking for each headline.  
Thirty sentence frames were constructed. They covered a range of health and lifestyle-
related topics (e.g. diet, pregnancy, mental health). Each frame was used in six forms 
corresponding to the six categories of relationship: direct cause, can cause, conditional 
cause, ambiguous, correlation and conditional correlation (see Table 5 and Supplementary 
Information). Across the 30 sentence frames each modal verb, ambiguous expression and 
correlation expression was used an equal number of times, and expressions were 
approximately counterbalanced. Because causal expressions are more varied in the news (see 
Table S1 Supplementary Information) we used more examples of direct cause expressions 
(consequently each causal expression was presented less frequently than the other 
expressions). Where direct cause expressions specified the direction of relationship (e.g. 
boosts, reduces) the same expression was used in the ambiguous, correlation and conditional 
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correlation sentences. For example “Dietary advice reduces saturated fat intake” was 
changed to “Dietary advice predicts reduced saturated fat intake” for the ambiguous sentence. 
 
Table 5.  Example stimuli from Experiment 4. 
Relationship Category Sentence 
Direct cause Being breast fed results in better behaviour in children 
Can cause Being breast fed can result in better behaviour in children 
Conditional cause Being breast fed may result in better behaviour in children 
Ambiguous Being breast fed is linked to better behaviour in children 
Correlation Being breast fed is associated with better behaviour in children 
Conditional correlation Being breast fed may be associated with better behaviour in children 
 
 
Procedure. Participants were given instructions to rank sentences according to the 
degree of causal implication. They were told to place them in order from most causal at the 
top to least causal at the bottom. No feedback was provided on their responses. 
The instructions contained two examples. Each used a single sentence frame expressed 
in four versions. The first sentence frame was, “Eating baked beans are [expression] to cause 
large elbows,” and the second, “Cycling is [expression] to cause headaches”. The expressions 
were: very likely, likely, unlikely and highly unlikely. Participants were told to position the 
statements so that the most causal headline (i.e., “baked beans are very likely to cause large 
elbows”) was at the top, the next most causal headline below (i.e., “baked beans are likely to 
cause large elbows”), and the least causal (i.e. “baked beans are highly unlikely to cause large 
elbows”) at the bottom. Following the example questions, participants were randomly 
assigned to two sentence frames, one for the first question and one for the second. 
At the end of each question participants confirmed that they had ordered their 
statements from most causal to least causal. To ensure that participants read all of the 
headlines, each question was presented for a minimum of 90 seconds (there was no time limit 
on the first example question and 60 seconds for the second example question). 
 28 
Exclusion criterion. We decided upon an exclusion criterion post hoc to remove 
participants who were ranking the statements at random. We reasoned that while statements 
ranked in the middle of the scale might differ across sentence frames (and therefore 
questions), those at the extremes would not. We therefore excluded participants who were 
inconsistent in their rankings of the most causal, or the least causal, across questions. For 
example, a participant who ranked direct cause as most causal in the first question but 
ambiguous as the most causal in the second question was removed (results of the analysis for 
the full sample is provided in the Supplementary Information).  
We also reversed ranks for participants who appeared to have misread instructions and 
ranked statements from least to most causal, rather than vice versa (n=65). Ranks were 
reversed where participants had consistently placed direct cause as the least causal item 
(based on the results of Experiments 1-3 showing that direct cause is consistently rated as the 
most causal statement of relationship). 
Results and discussion 
To avoid carry-over effects from answering multiple questions we only analysed 
causality rankings for the first question (rankings for the second question were used purely 
for the exclusion criterion, see above). Figure 4 shows the mean causality rankings for each 
condition. A Friedman test revealed a significant overall effect of relationship category 
(χ2(5)=900.92, p<0.001). Follow-up Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests revealed significant 
differences between all conditions (all ps0.003 <0.001; all rs > 0.2), with the exception of the 
comparisons between conditional cause and ambiguous (p0.003 =0.08; r = 0.09; B = 0.17) and 
conditional cause and correlate (p0.003 =0.01; r = 0.14; B= 2.5). Effect sizes were large for 
comparisons between direct cause and all other conditions and between conditional 
correlation and all other conditions (all rs >0.57). All other comparisons were in the small-
medium or medium range. 
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The results generally support the ordering we observed in the previous experiments. 
However, there were two exceptions. The first is that ambiguous statements, such as “linked 
to”, were significantly more causal than correlation statements, such as “associated with” 
(p<0.001; r=0.22; and Bayes factors showed decisive evidence in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis, B=5054), unlike Experiment 1, in which we did not find a difference (and the 
Bayes Factor from Experiment 1 indicated substantial evidence in favour of the null 
hypothesis [B=0.21] suggesting that this was not due to low power). The second is that 
conditional cause statements, such as “may result in”, were not ranked lower than correlation 
statements, unlike Experiments 2 and 3, where we did find a difference. We suggest that the 
inconsistency across experiments can be explained by differences in the methodology (free 
choice vs ranking), different samples of participants across experiments (undergraduate 
Psychology students vs online recruitment) and different materials (see Supplementary 
Information). We discuss this further in the General Discussion. In the next section we use 
our results to redefine exaggeration and apply this definition to the reanalysis of Sumner et al. 
(2014, under review).  
 
 
Figure 4. Mean causality rankings for each category of relationship in Experiment 4.  
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Reanalysis of Sumner et al. (2014, under review) 
Sumner et al. (2014) analysed the association of exaggerations in news and health-
related press releases issued by leading UK Universities. One of the foci for analysis was 
causal statements referring to research with correlational designs. Their results showed that 
33% of press releases contained exaggerated causal claims and suggested that the majority of 
exaggeration in the news is already present in the preceding press release. However, Sumner 
et al. analysed exaggerated causal statements from correlational research using a seven level 
scale: direct cause; can cause; conditional cause; ambiguous; correlation; statement of no 
relationship; no causal claim (see Table S1, Supplementary Information). “Exaggerations” 
were defined as any increase in this scale relative to what was stated in the journal article. For 
example, a press release that used an ambiguous expression where the journal article used a 
correlation expression was classed as an exaggeration.  
Our results suggest that Sumner et al. (2014, under review) over-estimated the rate of 
exaggeration, however. We found no evidence to support a categorical difference between 
conditional cause, ambiguous and correlational statements. We did not find that “may cause” 
is more causal than ambiguous statements such as “predicts” (Experiment 4), or consistently 
more causal than statements of correlation (Experiments 2, 3 and 4). Similarly, correlational 
statements were considered just as, or almost as, strongly causal as ambiguous phrases 
(Experiments 1 and 4). If readers do not reliably distinguish between these expressions, then 
one could argue that changes from one expression to another within these categories should 
not be considered exaggerations. We therefore re-analysed the data from both Sumner et al. 
(2014) and Sumner et al. (under review) using a scale in which conditional cause, ambiguous 
and correlation categories were grouped together into a single moderate cause category. All 
other aspects of the analysis were identical to that described in Sumner et al. 
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Results (Sumner et al., 2014) 
Reducing the number of causal categories from seven to five necessarily reduced the 
calculated rate of exaggerations: 19% (95% CIs 14% to 25%) of press releases and 32% 
(95% CIs 24% to 41%) of news contained more strongly causal main statements about 
correlational results than those present in the associated journal article. This compares to 33% 
of press releases and 39% of news under the original analysis (95% CIs 26% to 40% and 31% 
to 49%, respectively). However, the association between exaggerated news and exaggerated 
press releases remained clear (see Figure 5.A). The odds of exaggerated statements in the 
news was 12 times higher (95% CIs 4.7 to 29.7) when press release statements were 
exaggerated; 72% of causal claims in the news were exaggerated when the press release 
contained exaggeration (95% CIs 54% to 85%) compared to 19% when it did not (95% CIs 
12% to 27%; difference 53%, 95% CI 49% to 78%).  
The second main result – that there was no clear evidence for an association between 
exaggeration and improved news uptake – also remained (Figure 5.B): 72/146 (49%) press 
releases without exaggeration had news uptake compared with 22/35 (63%) press releases 
with exaggeration (95% CIs of the difference -5% to 31%). For the press releases that did 
generate news, non-exaggerated main causal claims were associated with 2.9 news stories per 
press release, whereas exaggerated causal claims were associated with 2.4 news stories per 
press release (95% CIs of  the difference -0.7 to 1.4). 
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Figure 5. Reanalysis of causal claims from Sumner et al. (2014) with five categories of relationship. 
Panel A shows the association between exaggeration of statements in the news and press releases. 
Panel B shows news uptake of press releases with and without exaggerated statements. Error bars are 
bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Results (Sumner et al., under review) 
We also reanalysed Sumner et al.’s (under review) latest results in which they 
replicate their previous findings for press releases from eight prominent science and medical 
journals (Lancet, British Medical Journal (BMJ), Science, Nature, Nature Neuroscience, 
Nature Immunology, Nature Medicine, and Nature Genetics). Similar to academic press 
releases, Sumner et al. showed that exaggerated causal statements in journal press releases 
predicted exaggerated statements in the news (odds ratio 10.9, 95% CIs 3.9 to 30.1) but were 
not associated with increased news coverage. 
Reducing the number of causal categories reduced the calculated rate of 
exaggerations: 13% (95% CIs 8% to 19%) of press releases contained exaggerated causal 
claims, compared to 21% when causal claims were split into 7 categories. Likewise, the 
proportion of news stories with exaggerated causal claims dropped from 38% with 7 
categories to 31% (95% CIs 21% to 42%). Again, the association between exaggerated news 
and exaggerated press releases remained clear. The odds of exaggerated statements in the 
news was 7.3 times higher (95% CIs 2.5 to 21.4; Figure 6.A) when press release statements 
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were exaggerated (74%, 95% CIs 52% to 89%) than when they were not (25%, 95% CIs 17% 
to 35%). 
There was still no evidence that exaggeration was associated with improved news 
uptake (Figure 6.B). With five categories of relationship, 71/142 (50%) press releases without 
exaggeration had news compared to 15/22 (68%) press releases with exaggeration (95% CIs 
of the difference -4% to 38%). For the press releases that did generate news, the average 
number of news stories per press release was 3.2 per non-exaggerated press release, and 2.1 
for an exaggerated press release (95% CIs of the difference -2.0 to -0.1).  
 
 
 
Figure 6. Reanalysis of causal claims from Sumner et al. (under review) with five categories of 
relationship. Panel A shows the association between exaggeration of statements in the news and press 
releases. Panel B shows news uptake of press releases with and without exaggerated statements. Error 
bars are bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Discussion 
Analysis using five categories of relationship necessarily reduced the number of 
exaggerations present in the press releases and news articles but it did not change Sumner et 
al.’s (2014, under review) main findings: there remained a strong association between 
exaggerations present in the news and press release statements, and there also remained no 
support for the intuitive idea that exaggerations in press releases should increase news uptake. 
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General Discussion 
The science writer is faced with the difficult task of conveying scientifically accurate 
information while at the same time making the language interesting, varied, and appealing to 
readers. Our study was conducted to test how readers understand the diverse range of causal 
expressions currently employed in the media (see Table S1, Supplementary Information) and 
to provide evidence-based advice about the consequences of using those expressions. 
Causality ratings showed that different relational expressions communicate different 
degrees of causal implications. The most causal were those that were direct, such as 
“increases”, and “makes”. These expressions were rated consistently higher than the other 
expressions. When these same expressions were modified by “can”, however, causality 
ratings dropped significantly. Other expressions reduced causality ratings even further. 
Modifying the causal expression with “may”, “might”, or “could” lowered ratings, as did 
ambiguous or correlational expressions such as “linked to” and “associated with”. The causal 
judgements for these expressions, however, were not consistently different from one another 
across experiments. Finally, while there were differences in degrees of causality, the absolute 
value of even the lowest rated expression (“might cause”) was considerably above floor level. 
This suggests that participants thought that all expressions were at least moderately causal.  
Taken together, the results of this study indicate that readers distinguished between 
three categories of expression: direct cause; can cause; and moderate cause. Table 2 lists the 
expressions associated with each category. Direct cause and can cause expressions are as 
described and moderate cause expressions are shown by the conjunction of conditional 
cause, ambiguous, and correlation categories. We next discuss explanations of our findings 
before turning to the practical implications. 
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Differences across experiments 
We observed some inconsistency across experiments in how people understand weakly 
causal and correlational expressions. One explanation is that we collected ratings in 
Experiments 1 to 3 but rankings in Experiment 4 and that the difference between these 
procedures gave rise to the difference in findings. There are two main differences. The first is 
that ranking prevents participants from assigning the same score to multiple expressions, 
whereas rating does not. Ranking therefore requires participants to process the sentences 
sufficiently deeply to make a choice between expressions, whereas rating does not. This 
implies that ranking is more sensitive at detecting small differences in interpretation than 
rating. The second difference is that ranking uses a non-parametric scale, whereas rating uses 
a parametric scale. Thus large differences in interpretation would be curtailed in the ranking 
procedure, which might make it less sensitive. In short, the differences in procedure work 
against each other in terms of sensitivity and it is not possible to say that one method is more 
sensitive overall than the other. Furthermore, the pattern of our findings could not easily be 
explained by differences in sensitivity across paradigms. While a more sensitive rankings 
procedure might explain why we observed a difference between ambiguous and correlation 
expressions in Experiment 4 but not Experiment 1 (although the Bayes factor from 
Experiment 1 suggests otherwise), it cannot explain why we observed a difference between 
conditional cause judgements and correlate conditions in Experiments 2 and 3 but not in 
Experiment 4.  
The inconsistency across experiments might therefore be explained by other factors, 
such as different sentence frames and participant samples. Prior knowledge regarding the 
relationship between two variables plays some role in causal inference judgments and its 
effects will vary across individuals and sentence frames. In the extreme, judgements of highly 
plausible or implausible causal relationships will be insensitive to changes in the relational 
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expression, since prior knowledge will override the new information. For example, “High fat 
food is linked to weight loss” would be insensitive to the relational expression because it is 
strongly inconsistent with prior knowledge. Since judgements about the plausibility of 
particular relationships will vary across individuals, using different sentence frames or 
different samples of participants across experiments will lead to variability in causal 
judgements, as we observed. 
Interestingly, we observed differences across experiments in the weakly causal 
expressions, such as “associated with”, but not the strongly causal expressions, such as 
“boosts”. This could be because weak expressions convey a large range of potential 
relationships (i.e. they are uninformative), leaving participants with no option but to use their 
own knowledge to make a judgement, whereas strong expressions convey a very narrow 
range, allowing participants to abandon their prior knowledge and use the new information 
contained in the expression. For example, “High fat food is linked to weight loss” provides 
very little information about the strength of the causal relationship between high fat food and 
weight loss, and so the participant must rely on their knowledge to judge how strong the 
relationship is likely to be. “High fat food boosts weight loss”, on the other hand, convinces 
the reader that this a strong and directly causal relationship, therefore removing the necessity 
to use prior knowledge in order to interpret the sentence. Consequently, weakly causal 
expressions are more sensitive to variation in prior knowledge across individuals than 
strongly causal expressions, and so are much more prone to cross-experimental differences.   
Educational background 
While we observed robust differences in causal ratings across relational expressions, 
we did not we did not find effects of educational background. In this respect our results are 
similar to previous studies. Bleske-Rechek et al. (2015) found no association between 
education level and the likelihood of selecting correct statements when they split participants 
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according to whether or not they had a Bachelor’s degree. Similarly, Norris et al. (2003) 
found that the number of science courses taken was not predictive of performance, and 
reported that undergraduate students did not perform better on their tasks compared to a 
sample of high school students (Norris & Phillips, 1994).  
One explanation for this is that formal science education played no role in how 
participants understood the headlines. Instead, they might have been using more general, folk 
notions of causality and correlation. People might not know that random assignment of 
participants to conditions is the sine qua non of an experiment, say, but they nonetheless 
understand the difference between events that are causally linked and those that are merely 
associated. This is shown by work in other areas of cognitive psychology. For example, 
young children use causality in their representation of folk biology and physics (e.g., Inagaki 
& Hatano, 2002), causality underpins concepts and categories (Murphy & Medin, 1985), and 
people use knowledge differently when they believe it is causal compared to when they 
believe it is correlational (e.g., Rehder & Hastie, 2001). The absence of an effect of scientific 
education could be because the knowledge that was used to make responses was not 
grounded in science.   
Linguistic sources of causal meaning 
The variation in causal inference arose because different language was employed across 
conditions. We suggest that participants extracted the meaning using three linguistic sources 
of information.  
The first is the interaction between lexical content and syntactic construction. When any 
verb is used actively the resulting meaning involves causation (e.g., Pickering & Majid, 
2007). For example, “John kicked Bill” means that John was the cause of the kicking action 
on Bill. When verbs that express particular changes in state are used, such as “increases” or 
“boosts”, together with appropriate subjects and objects, such as “high-fat food” and “weight 
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loss”, the result communicates a strong causal relationship between subject and object. The 
causal inference in these cases is a combination of the lexical content of the verb, particular 
predicates, and an active voice construction.  
Causal meaning of ambiguous or correlational expressions, such as “is linked to”, was 
likely derived from a slightly different source, however. The weak or non-existent causal 
relationship cannot be lexically specified because cause and correlational relationships are 
equally consistent with the literal meaning of correlational expressions. For example, since 
cause and correlation are both links, “is linked to” cannot preclude a causal relationship. 
What might be happening instead is that the non-causal relationship arises through a 
conversational implicature (Grice, 1989). Since the writer chose to use a weak expression, 
such as “is linked to”, and they were in a position to utter a stronger expression, such as 
“results in”, the reader is licensed to infer that the stronger expression does not apply, that is, 
the writer meant that it is not the case that “results in” is an appropriate description of the 
relationship. An implicature account is given extra weight by noting that it is possible to 
defease the meaning of the correlational expressions without generating unacceptable 
utterances (the hallmark of conversational implicatures). For example, “High fat food is 
linked to weight loss; in fact, it is causally linked to weight loss,” is acceptable. In contrast, 
direct cause expressions (a literal meaning) cannot be defeased in the same way: “High fat 
food boosts weight loss; in fact, it is not causally linked to weight loss” is infelicitous.  
Finally, compositional mechanisms could also have contributed to causal meaning. In 
our experiments, participants judged “can VERB” expressions to be weaker than simple 
“VERB” expressions. Intuitively the “can VERB” construction weakens any kind of 
epistemic claim, not just those associated with causality. To see this, compare “Nitrosyl 
chloride can mollitate benzene,” with “Nitrosyl chloride mollitates benzene.” In these 
examples, the “can VERB” statement feels weaker than the simple statement, even though 
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“mollitate” is a nonword and so cannot be lexically associated with causation. Thus, 
knowledge of this linguistic construction might have caused participants to rate can cause 
expressions as less causal than direct cause expressions. Exactly why “can” conveys this 
meaning is difficult to say. Literally, “can” adds no relevant meaning to the unmodified verb 
form (both sentences communicate that the subject is able to perform some action on the 
object). As with the lexical communication of causality, it is possible that the additional 
meaning arises from a conversational implicature. In this case, a manner implicature, in 
which the addition of unnecessary material (“can”) makes the reader question why the writer 
did not use the unmodified verb form (the reason being that the writer was not confident 
enough about the relationship).  
We have suggested three linguistic sources of causal meaning for the statements we 
presented. This list is far from exhaustive but we hope it presents a starting point for other 
researchers to identify the psycholinguistic mechanisms behind inferring causal and 
correlation (future work may be able to link this study to more established research on 
causality in language, such as implicit causality effects, e.g., Stewart, Pickering, & Sanford, 
1998, or causal connectedness, e.g., Myers, Shinjo, & Duffy, 1987).  
Practical implications  
The current research suggests that readers distinguish three groups of causal 
expressions: direct cause; can cause; and moderate cause. These results have implications for 
science writers. We make the following recommendations: (1) writers should use direct cause 
expressions when conveying findings from rigorous experimental designs, (2) insert the word 
“can” prior to direct cause expressions when conveying uncertainty about experimental 
findings (e.g., where an intervention uses a small sample size or a new drug is only tested on 
healthy participants), and (3) use moderate cause expressions when discussing observational 
findings. A caveat to these recommendations, however, is that whatever the relational 
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expression, juxtaposing two variables in a headline implies at least a moderate degree of 
causality between them. Writers should be aware that this is the likely effect of their 
headlines and consider taking appropriate steps to mitigate the potential problems (e.g., 
including statements in the news story that explicitly deny evidence of a causal relationship). 
This advice applies not only to journalists and those writing the headlines (such as sub-
editors) but also to other science writers, such as press officers and academics. Press officers 
may be particularly important for accurately conveying the findings of health research to the 
public. Press releases have become a dominant link between health research and the media 
(Kiernan, 2006; Taylor et al., 2015; Williams & Clifford, 2009) and exaggeration in the 
media appears to be strongly associated with exaggeration in the preceding press release 
(Sumner et al., 2014, under review). Academics should also be aware of conflating 
correlation with causation. Although academic journal articles are peer-reviewed, they have 
been shown to frequently contain misleading information, with up to 53% of abstracts 
containing exaggerated causal language (Cofield, Corona, & Allison, 2010; Gonon, Bezard, 
& Boraud, 2011; Lazarus, Haneef, Ravaud, & Boutron, 2015; Yavchitz et al., 2012). We 
therefore recommend that science writers follow the above advice to ensure that the causal 
language they use is not exaggerated. 
Conclusion 
 The results of the current study show that readers distinguish between three categories 
of relational expression: direct cause; can cause; and moderate cause. Based on these results 
we suggest that journalists, editors, press officers and academics, modify their causal 
language, using these categories, to suit the study design of the research being discussed. 
Although we cannot claim that accurately reported science headlines are sufficient for the 
public to make well-informed choices related to their health (audience responses are complex 
and multiply determined; Kitzinger, 2004; Sturgis & Allum, 2004), we do argue that they are 
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a necessary starting point. Following the guidelines we present here should reduce the 
ambiguity present in press releases and, of most concern, news stories. 
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